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 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Industrial Boilers  
 
Industrial boilers are mainly used in the industries of energy and oil&gas, 
concretely in refineries and thermal or solar power stations, in order to boil 
water and use the resultant steam to make the turbines rotate so that electricity 
is produced. 
This process of boiling water involves a combustion that has to be both 
safe and efficient. This means that a control of the mixture air-fuel has to be 
carried out: the less amount of gas per unit of amount of air, the less efficient 
the combustion is; but an excess of fuel in the mixture can produce an 
uncontrolled burst that could cause an accident. 
Traditionally, when developing the control system of a boiler, the actions 
of modulating itself would be developed with analog equipments (continuous). 
The start and stop sentences, as well as interlocks, are digital (all/nothing) that 
might imply digital equipments. Nowadays, due to advances in microprocessor-
based systems, it is possible to achieve safety function with analog equipments 
that permit to evaluate different setting points in a unique device as well as 
provide a continuous measure of the variables in the whole operating range. 
 
In order to develop a control application is needed to understand three 
basic targets: 
 
 Make the boiler provide a continuous supply of steam in the 
required conditions of pressure and temperature. 
 
 Operate continuously the boiler in the less cost of fuel possible, 
keeping a high safety level. 
 
 Start and stop in a safety way, watch and detect insecure conditions 
and make the necessary decisions to a safe operation every time. 
 
The two first targets would be carried out by an analog control, while the 
third one would be work of the safety system and burners management. 
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A basic diagram of a boiler could be represented as shown in the figure 
below: 
 
Figure 1: Basic diagram of a boiler 
 
In this figure we can observe that fuel and air are mixed up in order to be 
burned inside the furnace.  The furnace consists of walls of water pipes that 
receive the radiant heat from the flame, where the maximum heat transfer is 
produced. The resultant combustion gases are cooled up and they exit the 
furnace, passing to the heat recovery area. 
The optimum air-fuel ratio is marked by each fuel by a percentage of 
oxygen excess and CO2 at flue gas outlet. While the percentage of O2 is unique 
and valid as an unequivocal rating of combustion quality, the CO2, as we can 
see in the figure below, could have the same value in optimum or unsafe 
conditions, so its use as a variable of the main process is discarded and it is only 
used as a secondary variable. Higher O2 concentration than required will cause 
cold combustion, lower O2 concentration will cause unburned fuel that could 
ignite unexpectedly. Consequently the correct design and adjustment of the 
combustion control will assure both safe and efficient operation. 
 
 
Figure 2: Air-fuel ratio diagram 
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On the other hand, the unburned rating in the combustion is defined by 
the existing CO in the gases. The increase of the level of CO in the gases is an 
indicative of the incompleteness of the combustion which means also reduction 
in plant efficiency. [1] 
 
1.2 Industrial safety: safety systems and PLC 
 
The control and safety systems needed for the mixture of air and gas 
should satisfy the safety specifications detailed in the industries standards, as 
there is no specific normative for this scope. In this case, the standard that 
regulates the safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector is the 
IEC 61511. This standard names this kind of systems as SIS (Safety 
Instrumented System). 
 
In this standard, between other many considerations, a description of the 
different Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) is given. These levels are discrete (from 
1 to 4) and have to be calculated taking into account the individual SILs of all 
devices involved in the SIF (Safety Integrated Function), that is to say sensors, 
programmable logic, and actuators. 
 
 
Figure 3: Basic diagram of a SIF 
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Safety Systems 
Safety systems are designed to protect people, equipment and 
environment to conditions that may be hazardous. In these cases they must act 
immediately carrying plant or equipment to a safe position. 
The IEC technical committee examined 34 accidents which were the 
direct result of failures in the systems of control and safety in different 
industries, in which results are the following: 
 Specifications: 44% 
 Changes after commissioning: 20% 
 Operation and maintenance: 15% 
 Design and implementation: 15% 
 Installation and commissioning: 6% 
These results show that almost half of the errors were due to incorrect 
specifications. As a consequence of this study, the Committee established some 
general requirements and strategies in order to obtain the functional safety for 
safety instrumented systems. These requirements have to be taken into account 
in each of the 16 steps of the safety global lifecycle: 
 
 
Figure 4: Safety global lifecycle 
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 The IEC 61511 standard defines the concepts of SIS, SIF and SIL as 
following: 
 
 Safety Instrumented System (SIS): Instrumented system used to 
implement one or more safety instrumented functions. An SIS is composed 
of any combination of sensors, logic solvers, and final elements. 
 
 Safety Instrumented Function (SIF): Safety function with a specified 
safety integrity level which is necessary to achieve functional safety and 
which can be either a safety instrumented protection function or a safety 
instrumented control function. 
 
 Safety Integrity Level (SIL): discrete level (one out of four) for 
specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety instrumented 
functions to be allocated to the safety instrumented systems. Safety 
integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity; safety integrity 
level 1 has the lowest. 
 
 
Technology Selection 
 
Each one of them has advantages and disadvantages. It depends on many 
factors: budget, size, level of risk, flexibility, maintenance, interface requirements 
and communications, safety, etc.. 
 
Concretely, PLC-based systems offer many advantages: low cost, 
communication capabilities and interfaces, graphics for the operator and self-
documenting, among others. Most PLCs are not designed with sufficient capacity 
to self and are not recommended for safety applications SIL2 or SIL3. The absence 
of self-diagnosis is the weak point of most of PLCs in safety applications 
 
There are many differences between a Standard PLC, general purpose, and a 
safety PLC. The following are the most important. 
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PLC fail-safe 
Meets strict standards of safety system 
design such as IEC61508, NFPA, FM. 
 
Certified by prestigious institutions such as 
TÜV competent. 
 
Self-diagnostic routines incorporate all 
hardware and software that detect any 
dangerous internal failure (> 99%). 
 
The fault is guaranteed safe situation if any 
internal component failure. 
 
The changes are automatically self-
documented so errors are minimized. 
[1] [2] 
                Standard PLC    
Does not meet any safety standard. 
 
The absence of a labor self diagnostics 
require extra maintenance frequent testing 
sometimes requires system shutdown. 
 
The dangerous failure "hidden" not 
detected, so that dangerous situations can 
occur. They are not safe from failure. 
 
 
Examples of undetected dangerous failures: 
Output short circuit, memory loss or 
corruption of data transfer or internal bus, 
blocking of I / O to state "1" or "0", the 
CPU failures, etc. 
 
 
1.3 IEC and IEC 61511 standard 
 
The object of the IEC is to promote international co-operation on all 
questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. The 
IEC meets an international consensus of opinions on the relevant subjects since 
each technical committee has representation from all interested National 
Committees. 
 
Concretely, the International Standard IEC 61511 had been prepared by 
subcommittee 65A: System aspects, of IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-
process measurement and control. 
 
This International Standard gives requirements for the specification, design, 
installation, operation and maintenance of a safety instrumented system (SIS), so 
that it can be confidently entrusted to place and/or maintain the process in a safe 
state. This standard had been developed as a process sector implementation of IEC 
61508. 
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In particular, this standard: 
 
 Specifies the requirements for achieving functional safety but does 
not specify who is responsible for implementing the requirements. 
 
 Applies when equipment that meets the requirements of IEC 61508, 
or of 11.5 of IEC 61511-1, is integrated into an overall system that is 
to be used for a process sector application. 
 
 Defines the relationship between IEC511 and IEC61508. 
 
 Applies when application software is developed for systems having 
limited variability or fixed programs. 
 
 Applies to a wide variety of industries within the process sector 
including chemicals, oil refining, oil and gas production, pulp and 
paper, non-nuclear power generation. 
 
 Outlines the relationship between safety instrumented functions and 
other functions. 
 
 Specifies for system architecture and hardware configuration, 
application software, and system integration. 
 
 Defines requirements for implementing safety instrumented functions 
as a part of the overall arrangements for achieving functional safety. 
 
 Uses a safety life cycle and defines a list of activities which are 
necessary to determine the functional requirements and the safety 
integrity requirements for the safety instrumented systems. 
 
 Requires that a hazard and risk assessment is to be carried out to 
define the safety functional requirements and safety integrity levels 
(SIL). 
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 Establishes numerical targets for average probability of failure on 
demand and frequency of dangerous failures per hour for the safety 
integrity levels. 
 
 Specifies minimum requirements for hardware fault tolerance (HFT). 
 
 Specifies techniques/measures required for achieving the specified 
integrity levels. 
 
 Defines a maximum of performance (SIL 4) and a minimum of 
performance (SIL 1) which can be achieved for a safety instrumented 
function. 
 
 Provides a framework for establishing safety integrity levels but does 
not specify the safety integrity levels required for specific 
applications. 
 
 Defines the information that is needed during the safety life cycle. 
 
 Does not place any direct requirements on the individual operator or 
maintenance person. 
[3]
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 1.4 Project Targets: 
 
 Find the source of the problem 
 
 Investigate the available technology and design industry standards  
 to develop an optimized design. 
 
 Solve the problem: 
 
• Examining required the level of safety depending on the severity 
of the hazard and the consequences of accidents. 
 
• Evaluate devices and replace the failed ones to be able to 
mitigate the consequences that could cause the accident. 
 
• Develop an integrated safety system that meets the required 
safety level risk analysis (HAZOP). 
 
• Quantitatively and qualitatively verify the validity of the safety 
system intended. 
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 2. BACKGROUND  
 
 2.1 Problem to be solved explanation 
 
This project is designed to cover an actual technical necessity in the alumina 
refinery of Aughinish located in Limerick (Ireland), whose boiler was designed by 
Foster Wheeler. The client, Rusal, noticed and accident carried out in this boiler 
and a team of experts investigated what happened. 
The boiler had experimented an explosion and the experts determined that it 
was caused by an error in the air/fuel mixture inside the boiler. The figure below 
shows the main elements of the boiler. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Boiler basic diagram 
 
2.2 ¿Why did this happen? 
 
What the experts committee concluded was that the air flowmeter performed an 
incorrect measurement of the air that was getting into the furnace, showing a quantity 
lower than the actual air getting inside. This fact made the system to put into the 
furnace more gas than required, storing a gasbag inside it. Then, the flowmeter noticed 
its own error and introduced an air jet, which reacted with the stored gasbag, causing 
the explosion. 
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In Annex 5 we can observe the different optimal amounts of fuel and air per 
percentage of maximum load. In other words, the graphics in this annex show the most 
suitable mixture of air and gas in different behaviors of the boiler. We can see that the 
optimal gas ratio at 23% boiler load is 4,78%, and 5,80% at 100% load. Then, it can be 
considered that the boiler is operating properly at 5,5% gas ratio considering an 
approximation for every percentage of maximum load. Foster Wheeler's engineers 
consider that the air/fuel mixture starts to be consider hazardous when the gas ratio 
overcomes 7% in order to have a 1,5% margin of fuel excess, so as not to stop the 
boiler in case the flow in the gas pipe increases. 
Therefore, this accident was caused by two main factors: the impossibility of the 
system to recognize its measurement errors, and the little margin of actuation of the 
system for avoiding an accident in case an error occurred.  
 
Steps of the accident 
 
1. The boiler was operating in its regular behavior, burning 8581 Kg/h of gas, which 
implies 148906 Kg/h of air.   
2. An increase of load until 12302Kg/h of gas within the next 2 minutes is produced. 
The measurement of air is less increased than what flowmeter shows. 
3. Load stays stable in the mentioned value, but too much gas is being introduced 
than it could be all burned by the available air. 
4. The measurement of air returns to be correct and the amount of air in the furnace 
increases, which produces the sudden combustion of a great amount of unburned gas. 
 
2.3 How problem could be solved 
 
 Once we have defined the problem, we are going to analyze several ways to 
solve it. Hereunder, the most reasonable ones are described in detail. 
The former system consisted of the following elements: 
 A flowmeter for the measurement of the gas entering the boiler. 
 A flowmeter for the measurement of the air entering the boiler. 
 An electro-pneumatic positioner for the regulation of the gas entering 
the boiler. 
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 A damper for the regulation of the air entering the boiler, governed by a 
pneumatic actuator activated by an electro-pneumatic positioner.  
 A PLC for the regulation of all the system (valves actuation as a 
function of the flowmeters measurements). 
 The functionality of the above mentioned elements shall be optimized in a 
safety way in order to avoid the future recurrence of the problem. 
 
2.3.1 Increasing maintenance works 
 
 The maintenance works of the elements of the system carried out in the plant 
were those whose manufacturers recommended. However, the study has concluded 
that if this maintenance would be more frequent, the probability of the occurrence of 
the accident would have been lower. 
 Therefore, one solution for the problem could consist of the following actions: 
• Carrying out an exhaustive inspection of all the elements in order to check its 
capability to continue working properly. 
 
• Getting rid of the damaged elements and substituting them by new elements 
with the same characteristics. 
•  
• Checking the performance of the whole system once installed and energized 
(Site Acceptance Test and Commissioning). 
•  
• Once the system is working as before the accident, the proposed solution 
would consist of: 
•  
• Increasing the maintenance personnel in order to reduce the time between the 
functional tests to be performed in each element. 
•  
• Substituting the elements that are damaged or suspect to fail, instead of trying 
to repair them. In other words, trying to have the elements new at any time. 
•  
The proposed solution has the following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages: 
-It reduces risk although does not assure functional safety.  
-It is a very easy solution to be implemented. 
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Disadvantages: 
-A lot of personnel would have to be contracted and some elements would be 
occasionally purchased.  
-The system design keep being unsafe, and therefore more accidents can be 
caused. This solution merely tries to mitigate a very gauffer system by 
increasing maintenance works. 
2.3.2 Increasing process safety margin 
 
 As shown in the attached tables of Annex 5, the air/fuel mixture in a normal 
performance of the boiler is around 94,5% air – 5,5% fuel. 
 The former safety system was design following a very basic solution. This 
system triggered an emergency signal which cut off the gas valve when the air and gas 
flowmeters stated that the mixture had a 7% of gas, which is considered to be 
hazardous. 
Therefore, one solution for the problem would be to increase the air/fuel rate 
that enters the boiler, increasing the process safety margin. In order not to get a too 
much inefficient combustion, but obtaining a considerable risk reduction, the air/fuel 
mixture entering the boiler could be modified to 96,5% air – 3,5% fuel. Therefore, we 
would have a 3,5% process safety margin of gas entering the boiler. 
 This solution has the following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages: 
-The risk situation is more unlikely because it is a very remote situation of 
performance of the system. 
- It is the cheapest solution in terms of implementation. The only costs are 
those related to the reprogramming of the corresponding PLC. 
Disadvantages: 
- Although the implementation costs are very low, this solution is the most 
expensive one for the customer, inasmuch as the combustion is more 
inefficient. The more air is introduced in the boiler, the colder the flame gets. 
-Although the probability of the risk occurring is reduced, it remains being an 
unsafe system and the system itself does not detect any hazard. 
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2.3.3 Increasing equipment functional safety 
 
As stated in 2.2, the failure in the system was produced by an incorrect 
measurement of the air entering the boiler and the no-existence of a system detecting 
such an error. This error was a random error that happened among a wide variety of 
possible errors in the system, taking into account that any of the elements of the list 
above, except the PLC, comply with the IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 standards.  
Therefore, what is broadly needed to be modified in the system are flowmeters 
and actuators, and the way they are installed. Besides, the new Safety Instrumented 
Function includes a 2 ways / 2 positions electro-pneumatic valve that cuts off the 
supply of gas when an error occurs. 
For the air measurement, a venturi tube is needed. This necessity comes from the 
fact that a device for the measurement of the flow does not exist per se. The venturi 
tube is based on the Benouilli's principle. 
This principle states that an increase in the speed of the fluid occurs 
simultaneously with a decrease in pressure, as the following formula shows: 
 
where: 
 is the fluid flow speed at a point on a streamline, 
 is the acceleration due to gravity, 
 is the elevation of the point above a reference plane, with the positive z-
direction pointing upward – so in the direction opposite to the gravitational 
acceleration, 
 is the pressure at the chosen point, and 
 is the density of the fluid at all points in the fluid.  [4] 
 
Therefore, in our system, we need a device (Venturi Tube) that could modify the 
value of any of those variables that could perform an equivalent variation on the flow 
value. In this case, as shown in the figure below, the fluid has to pass through a tube of 
a diameter D, and then trough a diameter d, thinner than D, which makes the fluid 
increase its pressure and flow.  
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 Figure 6: Venturi Tube graphic 
 
As a consequence, we can measure the differential pressure at the ends of the 
tube and, using Benuilli's principle, we can compute the flow measurement. [5] 
This solution has the following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages: 
-It is the safest system by far. Although a risk situation is reached, it is very 
unlikely that the system does not detect it, and, once detected, it is very unlikely 
that it does not mitigate it. 
-The client only has to make an investment in the implementation of the new 
system. It would not have to face additional maintenance or inefficient-
performance-related costs. 
Disadvantages: 
-A technically complex designed is required to be carried out. 
 
2.3.4 Selection of the most suitable solution 
 
The selected solution for the proposed problem will be the explained in header 
2.3.3, inasmuch as it is the most economical solution for the client in the long term and 
it is the safest by far. 
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2.4 Project Planning 
  
 For the time being, we have defined the problem, identified the causes, 
proposed different solutions, and chosen the most appropriate one, according to the 
related standard of functional safety (IEC 61511). 
 Our target now is to define which are going to be the next steps in order to 
execute this solution, under the guidance of the mentioned standard. IEC61511 defines 
the safety lifecycle (see figure 4), that is to say, the necessary steps to be followed in 
order to achieve functional safety required in the project. However, this project only 
covers one specific safety function inside the whole safety instrumented system of an 
existing plant. For this reason, most of the steps indicated in this safety cycle does not 
apply in this project. 
 
The necessary steps to be followed in the execution of the project are listed hereunder: 
 
• Overall explanation of the IEC61508 and IEC61511. 
 
• Description of boiler elements involved in the project 
 
• State the risk evaluation, using the HAZOP method. 
 
• Definition of the required SIL level, considering the characteristics of the evaluated 
risk. 
 
• Assignation of the required safety instrumented function to its risk. 
 
• Definition of the safety instrumented system requirements. 
 
• Safety instrumented system design. 
 
• Calculations for verification the required SIL level. 
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3. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: IEC61508 AND IEC61511 
 
 In 1998 the IEC, which stands for International Electrotechnical 
Commission published a document, IEC 61508, entitled: “Functional safety of 
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems”. This document 
sets the standards for safety-related system design of hardware and software. IEC 
61508 is generic functional safety standard, providing the framework and core 
requirements for sector specific standard. Three sector specific standards have been 
released using the IEC 61508 framework, IEC 61511 (process), IEC 61513 (nuclear) 
and IEC 62061 (manufacturing). IEC 61511 provides good engineering practices for 
the application of safety instrumented systems in the process sector. [3] 
In the United States ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004 was issued in September 2004. 
It primarily mirrors IEC 61511 in content with the exception that it contains a 
grandfathering clause: 
For existing safety instrumented systems (SIS) designed and constructed in 
accordance with codes, standards, or practices prior to the issuance of this standard 
(e.g. ANSI/ISA 84.01-1996), the owner/operator shall determine and document that 
the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe 
manner. [6]  
The European standards body, CENELEC, has adopted the standard as EN 
61511. This means that in each of the member states of the European Union, the 
standard is published as a national standard. For example, in Great Britain, it is 
published by the national standards body, BSI, as BS EN 61511. The content of these 
national publications is identical to that of IEC 61511. Note, however, that 61511 is 
not harmonized under any directive of the European Commission. 
IEC 61511 covers the design and management requirements for SISs from 
cradle to grave. Its scope includes: initial concept, design, implementation, operation, 
and maintenance through to decommissioning. It starts in the earliest phase of a 
project and continues through startup. It contains sections that cover modifications that 
come along later, along with maintenance activities and the eventual decommissioning 
activities. 
The standard consists of three parts: 
• Framework, definitions, system, hardware and software requirements 
• Guidelines in the application of IEC 61511-1 
• Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels 
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4. BOILER ELEMENTS 
 
4.1 Forced draft fan 
  
  This device supplies the required air flow in the combustion. The fan its 
 calculated so that it gives 0 pressure in the fund of the smokestack in 
 conditions of nominal load. 
  The movement of these fans could be performed by a motor or by the 
 steam-turbine. 
 
Figure 7: Forced draft fan 
 
4.2 Windbox 
 
Air enters a box called windbox. In this area are the guns, burners, flame 
detectors and registers. These registers are the equipment surrounding the burners 
causing air turbulence so that the  fuel to burn properly. 
 
4.3 Flame detectors  
 
Flame detectors are devices used to confirm the presence of flame 
inside the boiler furnace when burners are firing. Ultra-violet and infra-red 
optics are the most common principles of measurement for this purpose. By 
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this way, a wide range of colors of flames can be detected with these 
instruments, which allows installing these equipments for any kind of fuel. 
 
 
Figure 8: Flame detector 
 
4.4 Economizer 
 
 It handles the cooling of the hot air from the furnace, transferring its heat to the 
 water of the steam-water circuit. 
 
4.5 Evaporator 
 
 It handles the warming of the water coming from the economizer up to the 
 boiling point temperature. 
 
4.6 Superheater  
 
 It handles the heating of the steam generated in the boiling process up to the 
 temperature that assures the absence of water, what is called superheated 
 steam. 
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4.7 Stack 
 
 It handles the exhaust gases to the atmosphere by creating a slightly negative 
 pressure at the stack outlet.   
 
4.8 Instrumentation 
 
 The instruments would be placed in: 
 Pressure and temperature variation points (e.g.: before and after a fan, 
before and after a heat exchanger) 
 Safety points as: 
 a) Furnace pressure: in this zone, pressure cannot be higher than 
 the pressure that was designed. 
 b) Oxygen excess in the stack: it is necessary to control  the 
 fuel air flow for ensuring a proper burning.  
 
4.9 Venturi tube 
 
The Venturi tube allows flow measurement with an accurate 60% higher than 
the orifice plate in the same conditions, and with a pressure drop of only 10 or 20% of 
the created differential pressure. It possesses great accuracy and allows the passage of 
fluids with a relatively large percentage of solids, although abrasive solids influence 
how they affect the accuracy of the measurement. 
 
For the calculation of the diaphragms, nozzles, Venturi tubes and various 
standards are used, among which are the following: 
 
 ISO 5167-1980. Measuring fluid flow through-orifice plates, nozzles or 
Venturi tubes inserted in circular section 
 ASME 19.5 standard - Flowmeter Computation Handbook. 
 A.P.I 2530 standard - September, 1985 for natural gas. 
 Principle and Practice of Flow Meter Engineering L.K. Spink (1978). 
 AGA-3 and AGA-7 - Gas Measurement Committee Report - American 
Gas Association, Cleveland, Ohio. 
[7] 
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5. SAFETY SPECIFICATIONS AND SIL STUDY 
 
5.1 Generalities 
 
Throughout a safety system, all hazardous situations have to be taken into 
account and, for each of them, there should exist a mechanism that minimizes 
risks in order to avoid its consequences.   
 
Generally, the proper steps to follows should be: 
 
-Hazard evaluation: The first thing to do should be numbering and 
identifying the present risks. A complete evaluation would avoid design and 
equipment supply changes. In the evaluation, the requested SIL should be 
computed for each case. 
 
-Assignation of the safety functions to the hazards: Once risks are 
defined, we would study the safety function we have to apply in order to avoid 
the risk or mitigate its consequences. 
 
-Safety system requirements: This is the most important phase in the 
process of the SIS. In it, we have to define the safety requirements: the kind of 
instrumentation to be used, the failure to response mode, and the characteristics 
of the performance of the SIS. 
 
-Design of the safety system: In order to guarantee safety of an 
installation, a series of considerations of design have to be taken into account to 
minimize or avoid failures. The design has to consider the redundancy of 
components and the characteristics of performance of the SIS. 
 
5.2 Risk Evaluation 
 
According to IEC 61511, the risk evaluation has to include: 
- A description of each risk and the factors that causes them. 
- A description of the consequences and the probability of the event. 
- Determination of the requirements in order to the reduction or avoidance of 
additional risks and obtaining the safety requirements.    
TFG Jorge Fuentes                                                                                                                           Page 21 
 
- A description about the measures taken to reduce hazards and risks. 
- A description of the considerations taken into account in relation to the 
average of the risk demand, average equipment failure, operation limitations, 
and human factors. 
- A first identification of the Safety Instrumented Function (SIF).  
For our case, only one hazard will be evaluated (as described in previous 
chapters), and a detailed HAZOP analysis is the most understandable way to 
include the previous mentioned requirements. 
Hereunder, a typical HAZOP is shown for the SIF of our project: safe 
air+fuel introduction in the boiler. The remaining SIFs of the whole SIS are not 
described because is not the aim of this work. Additionally, only the NODE for 
air+fuel and the DEVIATION less flow will be studied. 
The HAZOP analysis will be performed in a table with the following 
format: 
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS 
      
 
where 
-NODE: It is the part of the process to be analyzed. 
-GW: Guided Word. It is the word that is used to establish the deviation that is 
going to be studied. E.g. : more, less. 
-DEVIATION: It is the situation to be analyzed in the corresponding node. 
-CAUSES: They are the reasons by which the deviation occurs. 
-CONSEQUENCES: They are the negative results in the installation occurred 
due to the deviation. 
-SAFEGUARDS: They are the entire protections foreseen in the design to 
mitigate the effects of the deviation or to remove it. 
-RECCOMENDATIONS: They are additional cautions and safeguards to be 
taken into account for improving safety in the node. 
5.2.1. HAZOP 
Node: Air and gas according to drawing 1 (Annex 3.1) and drawing 2 (Annex 
3.2). 
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 5.3 Determination of the required SIL 
 
SIL is a measurement of a safety system performance, measured as a 
function of the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) of the loop (Safety 
Function). To compute the SIL level of a hazard, the range of the PFD is 
obtained for the Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) to be included in the Safety 
Instrumented System (SIS).  
 
The quantitative methods of the SIL computations would be quite tedious 
and they would involve making assumptions that could lead to error in the 
calculations. Therefore, we would better perform an alternative method called 
Risk Graph, which consist of 4 variables identified for each risk:  
 
• Degree of consequences (C): Measures the degree or quantity of 
fatalities that may happen as a consequence of the hazard to occur. 
 C1: Minor damages and some slightly injured person. 
 C2: Seriously injured several people and one death. 
 C3: Several dead people. 
 C4: High fatality: many deaths 
 
• Exposure frequency (F): possibility of the presence of people in the 
danger zone 
 
 F1: From rarely to frequently 
 F2: From frequently to permanently 
 
• Probability of danger avoidance (P): depending on whether the 
dangerous variable is controlled and monitored, if it takes much or little 
time to occur, whether or not easily detectable and whether there are 
loopholes 
 
 P1: Possible under certain conditions 
 P2: Almost impossible 
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• Probability of danger (W): Always taking into account the worst 
case 
 
 W1: There is little likelihood of danger and of little consequence if 
it occurs 
 W2: There is little likelihood of danger 
 W3: There is a relatively high probability of the hazard occurring 
 
The following graphic shows the SIL levels needed for guaranteeing safety in a 
plant taking into account the C, P, F and W variables: 
 
Figure 9: SIL Levels needed for guaranteeing safety. 
 
For the case at hand, the mentioned parameters have the following values: 
 
• Degree of consequences (C): As shown in the HAZOP, the worst 
consequence of the hazard studied is the explosion of the boiler. Usually, 
several maintenance operators are working in the proximity of the boiler 
during its normal operation. Besides, it is also frequently to find one 
operator in boiler platforms helping control room operators to solve the 
problems that appears in the control system screens. For the mentioned 
reasons, the degree of consequences assigned to this SIF is: 
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 C2: Seriously injured several people and one death 
• Exposure frequency (F): Because of boiler demand is higher during 
the day, the maintenance requirements are higher too. Therefore, it can be 
inferred that the possibility of finding operators near the boiler is reduced 
at nights. For this reason, the exposure frequency assigned to this SIF is: 
 F1: From rarely to frequently 
• Probability of danger avoidance (P): It can be said that unique 
medium to detect the correct mixture of air-fuel is through the 
measurement of the flow of each fluid using the current technology. If the 
flow measurement fails, there is no way to avoid the occurrence of the 
risk. For this reason, the probability of danger avoidance is: 
 P2: Almost impossible 
• Probability of danger (W): As the defined danger is a boiler load 
increase (fuel flow increase), it can be assured that the probability of the 
occurrence of this danger is relatively high, because apart from the load 
changes required by the plant, the operators have a certain level of 
freedom to changer the boiler load under their responsibility.  
 W3: There is a relatively high probability of the hazard occurring 
 
Therefore, introducing the obtained parameters in the table shown in 
figure 7, the result is that we need a SIL 2 level for guaranteeing safety in our 
system. 
 
 
5.4 Assignation of the Safety Instrumented Function  
 
Once the risks are defined, we should have to determine the strategy of 
prevention that our safety instrumented function (SIF) is going to apply. 
 
 
Figure 10: SIF basic diagram 
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To find out which sensor should be used, the first thing that should be 
done is to consider what type of variable can be measured to prevent the risk. 
The logical system is typically a shared resource for all safety 
instrumented functions. Therefore, it must have the highest SIL of all process 
safety functions. 
As a result of the HAZOP, the following assignation corresponds to the 
SIF object of the present project.  
 
HAZARD: Fuel flow increase (e.g. more boiler load required by the plant) 
SIF: Boiler trip in case of Low Air Flow Signal activated in air flow 
transmitters. 
SIF COMPONENTS:  
-SENSOR: Venturi and air flow transmitter/s (complying with IEC 61508 
requirements) installed in the duct that introduces air in the combustion 
chamber. 
-LOGIC SYSTEM: Safety PLC (complying with IEC 61508 
requirements). 
-FINAL ELEMENT: Fuel shut-off valve/s (complying with IEC 61508 
requirements) that causes boiler trip when closing. 
 
5.5 SIS Safety Requirements 
 
Before the SIS design phase, the requirements that will be taken into 
account in all components and safety actions should be defined. 
The requirements that should be specified in the safety system are: 
- A description of all the safety functions needed for obtaining the required 
safety: In this case, a single safety function is being studied, which consists in 
controlling that the air-fuel mixture is enough safe so that, on the one hand, the 
amount of air is enough for the combustion to be carried out, and on the other 
hand, fuel pockets in the furnace of the boiler, that could burst unexpectedly, 
are avoided. 
- The requirements for identifying and taking into account all the failures of 
common cause: Single point failure In this case, the single point failures are the 
venturi and the CPU of the PLC, which are the only two non-redundant 
elements of this SIF. The venturi is an element which is introduced inside the 
process conduit and a failure of the venturi equals a failure of the process, 
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which seems to be a very unlikely situation. Besides, very large conduits would 
be required to install more than one venturi to get redundancy.   
On the other hand, the CPU is a very tested element and its failure rates are 
very low, thus it is not necessary to redound them inside a SIF. 
- A description of the safety status that should be reached for each of the safety 
functions: Each time this SIF acts, the cut-off valves are de-energized, which 
will result in the shutdown of the combustion in the boiler. 
- A description of the frequency with which the performance test and equipment 
maintenance would be developed: For this SIF, it has been considered that the 
frequency of performance test and equipment maintenance is carried out is 1 
year. 
-The SIL and the mode of operation for each safety function: The required SIL 
for this SIF is SIL 2, and its operation will be continuous inasmuch as how 
combustion is produced has to be monitored at all times.  
-A description of the acquired measurements by the SIS and its trip settings: In 
the head 6.2 the measuring principle and the selected instrumentation for the 
measurement of the air flow is explained. The trip value of this SIF is variable, 
as at each moment it depends on the fuel flow introduced in the boiler. 
-A definition of the relationship between inputs and outputs of the SIS, 
including logic, mathematic functions and required permissions: The 
measurement of the air flow is carried out by three transmitters whose signals 
are sent to the PLC of the SIS, where a 2oo3 logic is applied (see head 6.6). The 
result of this logic is compared with the minimum flow value required in each 
moment. In case this value is less than the minimum required value, the 
energization of the valves is deactivated in order to proceed to close them.  
-Manual stop requirements. If there existed a concrete motive by which the 
operator should take an action to carry the system to a safe state, this should be 
specified: For this SIF a manual stop is not considered necessary by the 
operator since the system can detect at all times that the system is operating in 
safe conditions. 
-Requirements related to the energization or de-engization for trips: The final 
elements of this SIF are pneumatic valves actuated by single effect solenoids. 
The de-energization of these solenoids will provoke the expulsion of the 
compressed air of the pneumatic actuators and the force of the spring will push 
the valve to its safe position (closed). 
-Requirements for restarting the SIS after an emergency shutdown: Whenever 
the safety actuation of the FIS occurs, the operator is required to press a 
acknowledge button before re-introducing fuel into the boiler. Thus, it is 
intended to require the operator to evaluate the cause for which the trip occurs. 
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-Maximum percentage admissible of false trips: The maximum percentage of 
false shots has to be minimized as much as possible taking always into account 
the high safety requirements of this SIF. 
-The requirements for the software application: The software application has to 
comply with the IEC61508 and has to be provided with the necessary diagnosis 
for the detection of possible failures in the execution of the programmed logic. 
-Requirements for the bypasses including how they will be reset: Inasmuch as 
the considered equipment for this SIF is redundant, it is not necessary to install 
bypasses. In case of maintenance, one of the devices can be removed without 
affecting safety.  
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 6. SIS DESIGN 
 
 The IEC 61511 states in its 11th chapter the SIS requirements to guarantee 
the maximum degree of safety in the plant. These requirements are divided in the 
following chapters: 
• General Requirements 
• Field Devices Requirements 
• Interface Requirements (with the operator, with the 
engineering/maintenance, with other systems) 
• Test and maintenance requirements 
 For this SIS, the following design has been considered according to 
guidelines of the mentioned standard. In figure 11 we can see a schematic graphic 
of the FIS. 
 
 
Figure 11: SIF elements and connections 
 
 In it, we can identify the following elements:  
 Venturi 
 Flow Transmitters (FT) 
 Junctions Boxes 
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 Valves 
 Vortex Flow Meter (VFM) 
 PLC 
 Relays  
 Communications / Wiring 
 
6.1 VENTURI 
 
 As previously mentioned, the selected primary flow element for this 
application was a venturi tube. This device is designed considering the specific 
conditions of the process, such as pressure and temperature of air and operating flow.  
According to the process information provided by the plant company, the following 
combustion air parameters have to be considered for venturi design (values for 100% 
load): 
• Flow Rate 222603 Kg/h  
• Static pressure 1,040 Bar 
• Temperature 275 ºC 
• Density (At indicated pressure and temperature) 0,661 Kg/m3 
 According to the previous data, for venturi design, it has been selected a 
differential pressure of 11 mbar for full scale flow (maximum flow) as it is standard 
value and fits for this application. 
 Additionally, following transmitters manufacturers, flow rate for 100% load 
will be set at 75% of full scale range. Consequently, for full scale value (11 mbar) the 
flow rate to be considered shall be 222603 x (1 /0.75)Kg/h = 296804 Kg/h . 
 Relationship between differential pressure and flow is shown in the following 
equation: 
Q= K √(ΔP) 
where: 
Q= flow in Kg/h 
K= fluid dependant value 
ΔP= Differential pressure in venturi taps 
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  Considering this equation, to calculate the differential pressure for 100% load 
flow, the following steps shall be performed: 
1)  Calculate the square ratio between 100% load flow and maximum flow:  
(222603 Kg/h / 296804 Kg/h)2 = 0,5625 
2) Multiply the previous ratio by the full scale differential pressure. 
0.5625 x 11 mbar = 6.1875 mbar 
 Once the venturi performance values are defined, the only mechanical 
parameters to completely design the device are the size and material.  
 The selected material for this purpose is carbon steel. This material is 
appropriate for many corrosion fluids and good resistance to high temperatures and 
environmental agents. Therefore, as recommended in Annex 1.1, a carbon steel venturi 
tube of 6 mm thickness will guarantee its durability and proper performance for many 
years.  
 On the other hand, we have to calculate the diameter of the venturi tube. For 
that, we have to calculate first the section of the tube with the following equation: 
S= Qmax / ρ x V 
where: 
Q= Maximum air flow: 222603 kg/h = 61.834 kg/s 
V= Air speed: 25 m/s 
ρ= Air density: 0.661 kg/m3 
The section of the tube would be then: 
S= 61.834 kg/s / (25 m/s x 0.661 kg/m3) = 3.742 m2 
For calculating the diameter: 
S = π x r2  = π x (D/2)2   
D = 2 √(S/π) = 2 √(3.742 m2/π)= 2.183 m 
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6.2FLOW TRANSMITTERS 
 
As we have chosen a venturi as a primary flow element for the measurement of 
the flow rate, we will use differential pressure transmitters connected to both taps of 
the venturi tube, using the equation:  
Q= K √(ΔP) 
For this project we will use the Emerson’s Rosemount 3051 differential 
pressure transmitter, because we consider it as the most economic device in the 
market, considering its high reliability, and having Exida’s SIL 3 capable certificate, 
according to IEC61508. 
 
Looking at Rosemount 3051 flow transmitter datasheet, attached in the Annex 
1.2 we realize that the flow transmitter we would need will be the following model: 
3051CD1A02A1AM5B9DFE8H2P1Q4Q8QT 
Whose characters stand for: 
3051C: Coplanar Pressure Transmitter. Integrated differential pressure transmitter + 
sensor. 
D: Differential measurement type 
1: Pressure range: -25 to 25 inches H2O (-62,16 to 62,16 mbar)  
A: Transmitter signal output: 4-20 mA with Digital Signal Based on HART Protocol. 
0: Alternate Process Connection: Process connection selected to be suitable for 
flanged installation to manifold. 
2: 316LSST Isolating diaphragm: Sensor material selected in stainless steel 316L 
quality, suitable for most process conditions. 
A: Glass-filled PTFE O-ring: PTFE gasket for tight process installation. 
1: Silicone-filled: Silicone enclosure for sensor protection. 
A: Aluminum housing material (1/2 – 14 NPT Conduit entry size) 
M5: LCD Display for local indication 
B8: Traditional flange bracket, B3 with SST bolts 
DF: ½ - 14 NPT flange adapter(s) 
E8: ATEX Flameproof and Dust certification 
H2: Traditional Flange, 316 SST, SST Drain/Vent 
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P1: Hydrostatic Testing with Certificate, in order to check leakage. 
Q4: Calibration Certificate. 
Q8: Material Traceability Certification per EN 10204 3.1 
QT: Safety certified to IEC 61508 with certificate of FMEDA, in order to assure the 
suitability for installation in safety integration functions. 
 
Figure 12: Rosemount 3051C differential pressure transmitter 
 
 The Rosemount 3051C Coplanar design is offered for Differential Pressure 
(DP), Gage Pressure (GP) and Absolute Pressure (AP) measurements. The Rosemount 
3051C utilizes Emerson Process Management capacitance sensor technology for DP 
and GP measurements.  
 
 The major components of the Rosemount 3051 are the sensor module and the 
electronics housing. The sensor module contains the oil filled sensor system (isolating 
diaphragms, oil fill system, and sensor) and the sensor electronics. The sensor 
electronics are installed within the sensor module and include a temperature sensor 
(RTD), a memory module, and the capacitance to digital signal converter (C/D 
converter). The electrical signals from the sensor module are transmitted to the output 
electronics in the electronics housing. The electronics housing contains the output 
electronics board, the local zero and span buttons, and the terminal block.  
 
 For the Rosemount 3051C design pressure is applied to the isolating 
diaphragms, the oil deflects the center diaphragm, which then changes the capacitance. 
This capacitance signal is then changed to a digital signal in the C/D converter. The 
microprocessor then takes the signals from the RTD and C/D converter calculates the 
correct output of the transmitter. This signal is then sent to the D/A converter, which 
converts the signal back to an analog signal and superimposes the HART signal on the 
4-20 mA output. 
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 6.3 VORTEX FLOWMETER 
 
 For the measurement of gas flow in a pipe, several types of instruments can be 
used. The most common ones are the coriolis flowmeter, the magnetic flowmeter, the 
ultrasoinc flow meter, the turbine flowmeter and the vortex flowmeter, although there 
are a lot more. The most suitable instrument for this application is the vortex 
flowmeter due to its low price and easy installation. 
 The vortex flowmeter method of flow measurement involves placing a bluff 
body (called a shedder bar) in the path of the fluid. As the fluid passes this bar, 
disturbances in the flow called vortices are created. The vortices trail behind the 
cylinder, alternatively from each side of the bluff body. This vortex trail is called 
the Von Kármán vortex street after von Kármán's 1912 mathematical description of 
the phenomenon.  
 The frequency at which these vortices alternate sides is essentially proportional 
to the flow rate of the fluid. Inside, atop, or downstream of the shedder bar is a sensor 
for measuring the frequency of the vortex shedding. This sensor is often 
a piezoelectric crystal, which produces a small, but measurable, voltage pulse every 
time a vortex is created. Since the frequency of such a voltage pulse is also 
proportional to the fluid velocity, a volumetric flow rate is calculated using the cross 
sectional area of the flow meter.  
 The frequency is measured and the flow rate is calculated by the flowmeter 
electronics using the equation  where  is the frequency of the 
vortices,  the characteristic length of the bluff body,  is the velocity of the flow 
over the bluff body, and  is the Strouhal number, which is essentially a constant for a 
given body shape within its operating limits. 
 The selected vortex flowmeter for this project is Rosemount 8800D Series 
Vortex Flowmeter  
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 Figure 13: Rosemount 8800D Series Vortex Flowmeter 
 
Looking at Rosemount 8800D series vortex transmitter datasheet, attached in 
the Annex 1.3, we realize that the vortex transmitter we would need will be the 
following model: 
8800DF030SA1N1D1 
Whose characters stand for: 
8800D: Vortex Flowmeter 
F: Flanged style of metering  
030: 3 in. (80 mm) line size 
S: 316 wrought stainless and CF-3M cast stainless steel for the wetted materials 
A1: ASME B16.5 (ANSI) RF Class 150  
N: Standard sensor process temperature range (-40 to 232 ºC) 
1: 1/2 - 14 NPT - Aluminum housing 
D: 4-20 mA digital electronics (HART protocol) output 
1: Flow calibration 
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6.4 JUNCTION BOXES 
 
 In industrial installations, where a high volume of instrumentation devices are 
installed around the whole area, junction boxes are used to reduce electrical 
installation works and costs. 
 Junction boxes allow grouping some quantity of signals to be wired to PLCs 
located in control rooms, using a common multi-core cable. 
 In this case, 2 junction boxes are needed. One junction box will be used for 
grouping the 2-wire cables of the 3 flow transmitters round the venturi tube (6 wires in 
total) and another junction box for grouping the 2-wire cables of the 2 solenoids of the 
valves and the fuel vortex flowmeter. Both boxes will use 6 wire cables for PLC 
interconnection. 
A junction box consists of the following components: 
• Enclosure: the enclosure protects the devices installed inside the junction box. 
Therefore, it shall have a high degree of protection against the entry of water 
and dust. Besides, it shall have a high mechanical resistance to breakage. 
 
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standardizes the 
measurement of the degree of protection against water and solid particles, 
through IEC 60529, and against external mechanical impacts, through IEC 
62262. 
 
IEC 60529 qualifies as an alphanumerical way the level of protection of 
equipments against the entry of foreign materials through the code IPXX, 
being IP the acronym of "Ingress Protection", the first X a numerical digit for 
describing the level of protection against dust entry, and the second X another 
numerical digit for describing the level of protection against water entry. 
 
This standard rates from 0 to 6 the protection against dust entry (0: no 
protection, 6: no entry under any circumstances), and from 0 to 8 the protection 
against water entry (0: no protection, 8: no entry under complete and 
continuous immersion in water under more than 2 meters depth and for more 
than 2 minutes.  
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Solid particle protection table: 
 
Level Object size protected against Effective against 
0 — No protection against contact and ingress of objects 
1 >50 mm 
Any large surface of the body, such as the back of a hand, but no 
protection against deliberate contact with a body part 
2 >12.5 mm Fingers or similar objects 
3 >2.5 mm Tools, thick wires, etc. 
4 >1 mm Most wires, screws, etc. 
5 Dust protected 
Ingress of dust is not entirely prevented, but it must not enter in 
sufficient quantity to interfere with the satisfactory operation of 
the equipment; complete protection against contact (dust proof) 
6 Dust tight No ingress of dust; complete protection against contact (dust tight) 
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Liquid ingress protection table: 
 
Level Protected against Testing for Details 
0 Not protected — — 
1 Dripping water 
Dripping water (vertically falling drops) 
shall have no harmful effect. 
Test duration: 10 minutes 
 
Water equivalent to 1 mm 
rainfall per minute 
2 
Dripping 
water when 
tilted up to 
15° 
Vertically dripping water shall have no 
harmful effect when the enclosure is 
tilted at an angle up to 15° from its 
normal position. 
Test duration: 10 minutes 
 
Water equivalent to 3 mm 
rainfall per minute 
3 Spraying water 
Water falling as a spray at any angle up 
to 60° from the vertical shall have no 
harmful effect. 
Test duration: 5 minutes 
 
Water volume: 0.7 litres 
per minute 
Pressure: 80–100 kPa 
4 Splashing of water 
Water splashing against the enclosure 
from any direction shall have no harmful 
effect. 
Test duration: 5 minutes 
 
Water volume: 10 litres per 
minute 
Pressure: 80–100 kPa 
5 Water jets 
Water projected by a nozzle (6.3 mm) 
against enclosure from any direction 
shall have no harmful effects. 
Test duration: at least 
15 minutes 
 
Water volume: 12.5 litres 
per minute 
Pressure: 30 kPa at 
distance of 3 m 
6 Powerful water jets 
Water projected in powerful jets 
(12.5 mm nozzle) against the enclosure 
from any direction shall have no harmful 
Test duration: at least 
3 minutes 
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effects.  
Water volume: 100 litres 
per minute 
Pressure: 100 kPa at 
distance of 3 m 
6K 
Powerful 
water jets 
with increased 
pressure 
Water projected in powerful jets 
(12.5 mm nozzle) against the enclosure 
from any direction, under elevated 
pressure, shall have no harmful effects. 
Test duration: at least 
3 minutes 
 
Water volume: 75 litres per 
minute 
Pressure: 1000 kPa at 
distance of 3 m 
7 Immersion up to 1 m 
Ingress of water in harmful quantity shall 
not be possible when the enclosure is 
immersed in water under defined 
conditions of pressure and time (up to 
1 m of submersion). 
Test duration: 30 minutes 
 
Immersion at depth of at 
most 1 m measured at 
bottom of device, and at 
least 15 cm measured at 
top of device 
8 
Immersion 
beyond 1 m 
The equipment is suitable for continuous 
immersion in water under conditions 
which shall be specified by the 
manufacturer. Normally, this will mean 
that the equipment is hermetically 
sealed. However, with certain types of 
equipment, it can mean that water can 
enter but only in such a manner that it 
produces no harmful effects. 
Test duration: continuous 
immersion in water 
 
Depth specified by 
manufacturer, generally up 
to 3 m 
9k 
Powerful high 
temperature 
water jets 
Protected against close-range high 
pressure, high temperature spray downs. — 
 
 
 The required IP protection of the junction boxes for this project 
(established by the client) is IP66, which means no dust entry under any 
circumstances, and no water entry through a nozzle diameter of 12.5 mm, an 
average of 100 liters per minute and a pressure of 100 kN / m² for not less than 
3 minutes at a distance of not less than 3 meters. 
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 On the other hand, the IEC 62262 qualifies the level of protection 
against mechanical impacts, rating from IK00 (no protection), up to IK10 (20 
Jules protection, checked by dropping a 5kg object from a height of 40 cm).  
 
Mechanical impact protection table: 
 
IK 
number 
Impact energy 
(joules) 
Equivalent impact 
00 Unprotected No test 
01 0.15 Drop of 200 g object from 7.5 cm height 
02 0.2 Drop of 200 g object from 10 cm height 
03 0.35 Drop of 200 g object from 17.5 cm height 
04 0.5 Drop of 200 g object from 25 cm height 
05 0.7 Drop of 200 g object from 35 cm height 
06 1 Drop of 500 g object from 20 cm height 
07 2 Drop of 500 g object from 40 cm height 
08 5 Drop of 1.7 kg object from 29.5 cm height 
09 10 Drop of 5 kg object from 20 cm height 
10 20 Drop of 5 kg object from 40 cm height 
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 In this case, the client requires a IK07 protection, which means the 
junction box should resist an impact of 2 Joules (500 grams dropped from a 
height of 40 cms). 
  Because of its strength and its economic prize, the selected material for 
the junction boxes will be cast aluminum.  
  For these reasons, the selected enclosure for the junction box is the 
SA202012 model of Cortem (see Annex 1.4). 
• Din rail: The din rail is used as a standard bracket for electrical components. In 
this case, the din rail is used for the installation of terminals inside the junction 
box. For this project, the selected din rail is the NS 35/15-2,3 UNPERF 
2000MM – 1201798, of Phoenix Contact (see Annex 1.5). 
 
• Terminals: For this application, each junction box holds 3 pairs of wires, but 
they must have enough room for holding 2 more pairs for alternative purposes. 
Therefore, we would need a rack of 10 terminals. These terminals should have 
the following features: 
 -Maximum Load Current: 16 A 
 -Rated Surge Voltage: 6 kV 
 -Nominal Voltage: 500 V 
 
 Taking into consideration these factors, the most suitable terminals for 
these projects are the UK 4-TG – 2812018 of Phoenix Contact, whose 
datasheet is attached in Annex 1.6. 
 
 
 
• Cable glands: Cable glands are used in order to ensure the sealing of the cable 
entrance to the junction box, avoiding the entry of water and dust. As the 
enclosure, the client states an IP and IK level for cable glands, in this case, 
IP67 and IK07.  
 
 The most suitable cable glands for this project are the FL- series of 
Cortem, whose main features are: 
-Niquel-plated brass covering 
-CESI 00 ATEX 052 (Elfit) certificate: Explosion-proof certificate 
-IP 66/67 protection 
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 Figure 14: Cortem FL- Series Cable Gland 
 
 For this project, two types of cable glands are needed. One type for the 
single-pair cables (from instruments/valves to the junction boxes), and other 
type for five-pair cables (from junction boxes to PLC). 
 
 The single-pair cables diameter is 7.6 mm (explained in 6.8). Therefore, 
the required corresponding cable glands must have a size of ½". Looking at 
Cortem's table of Fl- products, attached in Annex 1.7, the required cable glands 
are the FL1BK. 
 
 The five-pair cables diameter is 14.3 mm, so we would need a FL2BK 
cable gland of the same brand of Cortem. 
 
6.5 VALVES 
 
 The required valves for this purpose are the on/off type which purpose is to 
cut-off the gas supply to the boiler in an emergency. Its characteristics are the 
following: 
Type: Ball valve. This valve has a very good sealing and they are not so much 
expensive for the required size. 
Internals: Both the valve itself and the other internals in contact with the fluid (wetted 
parts) are made of stainless steel, which is highly resistant to corrosion. 
Seating: Due to temperature conditions, a Teflon seating is required. This Teflon 
seating guarantees a great sealing and durability (resistance to corrosion). 
The valve is supplied with but-welded ends. This welding is very strong and the most 
suitable for flammable fluids. 
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Actuator: The pneumatic actuator is rack and pinion type, as for a ball valve is the 
required actuator. 
Solenoid+electrovalve: The actuator is operated by a 3 ways and 2 positions 
electrovalve, which is actuated by a F type solenoid and a 24 VDC voltage level. 
The selected electrovalve for the gas conduit is the EFR-Series of JC valves (see 
Annex 1.8). 
 
Figure 15: EFR-Series JC electrovalve 
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6.6 PLC 
 
 A Programmable Logic Controller, PLC or Programmable Controller is 
a digital computer used for automation of electromechanical processes, such as control 
of machinery on factory assembly lines, amusement rides, or light fixtures. PLCs are 
used in many industries and machines. Unlike general-purpose computers, the PLC is 
designed for multiple inputs and output arrangements, extended temperature ranges, 
immunity to electrical noise, and resistance to vibration and impact. Programs to 
control machine operation are typically stored in battery-backed-up or non-volatile 
memory. A PLC is an example of a hard real-time system since output results must be 
produced in response to input conditions within a limited time, otherwise unintended 
operation will result. 
 In recent years "Safety" PLCs have started to become popular, either as 
standalone models or as functionality and safety-rated hardware added to existing 
controller architectures (Allen Bradley Guardlogix, Siemens F-series etc.). These 
differ from conventional PLC types as being suitable for use in safety-critical 
applications for which PLCs have traditionally been supplemented with hard-wired 
safety relays. Such PLCs typically have a restricted regular instruction set augmented 
with safety-specific instructions designed to interface with emergency stops, light 
screens and so forth. The flexibility that such systems offer has resulted in rapid 
growth of demand for these controllers. 
 In the case of this application, as the previous PLC complied with the safety 
requirements of the IEC61508, it will not be replaced. This PLC is the Siemens S7-
400 (see Annex 1.9).  
Regarding the programming of the PLC, we will have to define the following 
logic in order to triplicate analog signals (from the flowmeters): 
- For each signal, the logic compares the analog input value with the interlock setpoint, 
i.e. low/low, and the corresponding digital signal is generated, low/low interlock. 
- In case of bad quality signal, out of range or open circuit or channel failure, the 
voting logic criteria will be to safe state. The digital output is set to safe state, low/low 
interlock in this example. 
- Then, the 2 out of 3 logic (majority voting) is performed with the three resultant 
digital signals for each setpoint, obtaining the final interlock signal to be used in the 
logic. 
- With the three bad quality signals, a 2oo3 logic is also performed to generate a bad 
quality alarm that will be used to filter the process alarms, low/low in this example, 
with the objective of adequately alarming if the interlock is due to process signals or 
bad quality in the analog input signals. 
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- The three analog inputs are compared pair by pair and a discrepancy alarm is 
generated if any of them has been deviated from the other two more than a certain 
percentage. 
 
6.7 RELAYS 
 
 The digital outputs of the PLC pass through relays for energizing the gas 
valves. These relays must be safety relays suitable for SIF installation and they must 
meet the requirements of SIL. The selected relay for this application is the Phoenix 
Contact PSR-SCP- 24DC/ESP4/2X1/1X2 model, whose datasheet is attached in 
Annex 1.10, which has the following characteristics: 
Input data 
Nominal input voltage UN: 24 V DC 
Input voltage range in reference to UN: 0.85 ... 1.1 
Typical input current at UN: 60 mA DC 
Voltage at input/start and feedback circuit:  Approx. 24 V DC 
Typical response time: 60 ms 
Typical release time: 20 ms 
Recovery time: 1 s 
Output data 
Contact type: 2 enabling current paths, 1 signaling current path 
Contact material: AgSnO2, + 0.2 µm Au 
Maximum switching voltage: 250 V AC/DC 
Minimum switching voltage: 15 V AC/DC 
Limiting continuous current: 6 A 
Maximum inrush current: 6 A 
Inrush current, minimum: 25 mA 
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 Figure 16: Phoenix Contact PSR-SCP- 24DC/ESP4/2X1/1X2 safety relay 
 
 
6.8 COMMUNICATIONS /WIRING 
 
For this installation two types of cables will be used: 
 
• Cabling between instruments and junction boxes: 2x1.5 mm2 (size 
recommended by manufacturer for field instrumentation). The requirements for 
this cable are: 
  
 -Conductor: Annealed electrolytic copper. Class 5. 
 -Insulation: Free Polyolefine halogenous nonpropagator of the fire (Z1). 
-Screen: Tinned copper drainage wire. (Generally 7x0.3mm-
S=0.5mm².). 
 -Sheath: Free Polyolefine halogenous nonpropagator of the fire Z1 
-Rank of temperature: For installation: [-5ºC / 50ºC]. In operation [30ºC 
to 70ºC] 
 -Radius of curvature: 10 x d (d=outer diameter) 
 -Service voltage: 300/500 V 
 
Taking into account these requirements, the selected cable for this application 
is the EOZ1 (ROZ1) - Z1OZ1 cable of Técnicas del Cable, whose datasheet is 
attached in Annex 1.11. 
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Figure 17: EOZ1 (ROZ1) - Z1OZ1 Técnicas del Cable cable 
 
 
• Cabling between junction boxes and control room: 5x2x1 mm2. In this case, a 
less section of the wires is used in order to reduce costs of installation (e.g. less 
weight of the cable, less radius of curvature, and less amount of copper). 
 
The selected cable for this application is the EHOZ1 (RHOZ1) - Z1HOZ1 
cable of  Técnicas del Cable, whose datasheet is attached in Annex 1.12. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: EHOZ1 (RHOZ1) - Z1HOZ1 Técnicas del Cable cable 
 
 
7. SIL VERIFICATION 
 
 In order to verify the SIL level of each of the SIF of the safety system, the 
required values for the IEC 61511 tables for Probability of Failure on Demand 
(PFD) must be fulfilled.  
  
7.1 PFD Verification 
 
The probability of failure on demand is a variable that can be calculated from the 
dangerous failure rate (λD) and the manual test interval (Ti expressed in hours). The 
PFD increases as a function of time following the formula: 
 
This formula can be approximated by: 
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As for PFD values greater than 0.1 the error is less than 3% (the PFD we are going to 
compute are much lower). Due to the fact that the PDF increases over time, after a Ti 
period, test must be carried out in order to get the initial PFD value again. For that 
time Ti, the average PFD value that we will use for the global PFD is: 
 
The PFD values must be introduced in the general formula of the loop of the safety 
function after checking it complies with the required SIL for this function. The general 
formula of the PFD is: 
PFDsystem = PFDS + PFDLS + PFDFE 
Being 
PFDS: PFD of the sensor or measurement instrument 
PFDLS: PFD of the logic system 
PFDFE: PFD of the final element 
Although equipment suppliers provide the SIL of those individually, the PFD and  
values must be required to them in order to calculate the PFD in case of redundant 
configurations, as in this case. 
SIL-PFD Correspondence 
Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL) 
Probability of 
failure on demand 
(PFDavg) 
Availability 
Reduction of target 
risk 
4 ≥10-5 to 10-4 >99.99% >10.000 to ≤100.000 
3 ≥10-4 to 10-3 99.90 - 99.99% >1.000 to ≤10.000 
2 ≥10-3 to 10-2 99.00 -99.90% >100 to ≤1.000 
1 ≥10-2 to 10-1 90.00 - 99.00% >10 to ≤100 
 
Whenever low demand exists (less than 2 triggers per year per risk), the average PFD 
value will be used to calculate the SIL. However, in the case of high demand, or 
continuous demand (2 or more triggers per year), the value of the corresponding PFH 
will be used, following the below table: 
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Probability of Failure per Hour (PFH) Safety Integrated Level (SIL) 
≥10-8 to <10-7 3 
≥10-7 to <10-6 2 
≥10-6 to <10-5 1 
≥10-5 to <10-4 With no special safety requirements 
 
In the case of redundant configurations, the redundant formulas have to be applied and 
then we must calculate the average of the resultant PFD. As a general rule, the 
following formulas shall be used for redundant configuration unless the manufacturer 
provides specific formulas for redundant configuration.  
 
 
Architecture PFDavg (Safety) Rate of spurious trips (Availability) 
1oo1 1/2· ·Ti  
1oo2 1/3·( ·Ti)2 2· s 
2oo2 ·Ti 2·( s)2·MTTR 
2oo3 ( ·Ti)2 6·( s)2·MTTR 
 
Being: 
 λD = Dangerous failures rate 
Ti = Manual test interval  
λs = Safe failures rate 
MTTR = Mean Time To Repair 
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7.1.1 PFD Calculation 
 
The SIF configuration of this system is represented in the following figure: 
 
Figure 19: SIF Architecture 
 In order to simplify calculations, the devices will be grouped according to its 
redundancy. For example, for the sensor, the PFD will be calculated as the result of the 
2oo3 logic of the sum of flow transmitters and analog input cards. The same criteria 
applies to the 1oo2 logic of the final element (digital output cards, relays and valves).  
 
 Therefore, in order to calculate the PFD of the whole system, we are going to 
calculate the PFD of the three main parts of the system PFDSENSOR, PFDLS and PFDFE 
and then we will sum them in order to obtain the final result. 
  
 Values for PFD calculation are obtained from manufacturer documents, which 
are included in Annex 2 (SIL certificates and PFD values). 
 
SENSOR: 2oo3 logic. Flow Transmitter (FT) + Input Card (AI: Analog Input) 
• Rosemount 3051 flow transmitter: λDu = 32 ·10-9  
• SM 336 F Analog Input Card (from Siemens PLC): λDu = 1.1 · 10-11 
As the flow transmitter and the analog input card follow a 2oo3 architecture, 
the following formula has to be used to calculate the PFD of the whole sensor.  
 
PFDSENSOR = (λDu · Ti)2 = [(λDuFT + λDuAI) · Ti]2 
 
PFDSENSOR = [(32 ·10-9 + 1.1 · 10-11) · 10·365·24]2  
 
PFDSENSOR = 7.86 ·10-6 
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LOGIC SOLVER: 1oo1 logic.  
 
• Siemens CPU 414-4H:  λDu= 2.83 ·10-8 
  
 As the CPU follows a 1oo1 architecture, we have to use the following formula 
 in order to calculate the PFD:  
 
PFDLS = 1/2 · (λDu · Ti) 
 
PFDLS = 1/2 · (2.83 ·10-8 · 10·365·24) 
 
PFDLS = 1.24 · 10-3 
 
 
FINAL ELEMENT: 
 
• SM 326 F Digital Output Card (From Siemens PLC): λDu= 1.6 ·10-9 
• Phoenix Contact PSR-SCP- 24DC/ESP4/2X1/1X2 relay λDu= 1.1 · 10-7  
• Valve: In the case of the valve, we only have to take into account the 
dangerous failure rates of the actuator (Prisma PI00 model) and the solenoid 
(Asco Controls 551 series) 
 
o λDuACTUATOR= 4.48 · 10-7 
o λDuSOLENOID= 4.57 · 10-10 
o λDuVALVE= λDuACTUATOR + λDuSOLENOID = 4.48 · 10-7 
 
As the final element follow a 1oo2 architecture, the following formula has to 
be used to calculate the PFD: 
 
PFDFE = 1/3 (λDuFE · Ti)2 
PFDFE = 1/3 [(λDuDO + λDuRELAY + λDuVALVE)· Ti]2  
PFDFE = 1/3 [(1.6 ·10-9 + 1.1 · 10-7 + 4.48 · 10-7) · 10 · 24 ·365]2 
PFDFE = 8.01 ·10-4 
 
 
PFDSYSTEM = PFDSENSOR + PFDLS+ PFDFE  
PFDSYSTEM = 7.86 ·10-6 + 1.24 · 10-3 + 8.01 ·10-4 
PFDSYSTEM = 2.05 · 10-3 
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 Once we have calculated the PFD of the system, looking at the table we can 
 verify the SIL level of the system: 
   
SIL-PFD Correspondence 
Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL) 
Probability of 
failure on demand 
(PFDavg) 
Availability 
Reduction of target 
risk 
4 ≥10-5 to 10-4 >99.99% >10.000 to ≤100.000 
3 ≥10-4 to 10-3 99.90 - 99.99% >1.000 to ≤10.000 
2 ≥10-3 to 10-2 99.00 -99.90% >100 to ≤1.000 
1 ≥10-2 to 10-1 90.00 - 99.00% >10 to ≤100 
 
 
 As our PFDSYSTEM is 2.05 · 10-3 , which is between 10-3 and 10-2 , we can 
conclude that the SIL level of our system is SIL2. 
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 8. CONCLUSION 
 8.1 Targets Fulfilled 
 
Our targets in this project were: 
• Finding the source of the problem: The experts committee concluded that 
the accident was caused due to a non-checked measurement error of the 
unique air flowmeter of the system (in the new SIS we dispose of three 
of them). As there was no Safety Integrated System implemented, a 
hazardous situation was very likely to be produced in case of a 
measurement error (or any other failure of the system). 
 
• Investigating the available technology and design industry standards to 
develop an optimized design: During the process of writing the work, a 
high understanding of functional safety was acquired in order to face the 
problem to be solved as the main functional safety standards recommend.  
 
To sum up, the main functional safety standards are the IEC61508 and 
the IEC61511.  
 
IEC61508 describes the minimum requirements that the E/E/PES 
(Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related) systems 
have to fulfill to be installed in a safety function. These requirements 
mainly consist of the diagnostic carried out in the devices in order to 
check that the signal they transmit coincides with the value of the 
variable they are measuring. 
 
IEC61511 describes how HAZOP and SIL studies have to be carried 
about, and which are the main parameters of devices (transmitters, 
valves...) to be studied in order to comply the functional safety 
requirements. Additionally, this standard describes the steps to be 
followed since the identification of the risk, the design of the Safety 
Instrumented System (SIS), and the assignation of safety functions to the 
identified risks. Finally, the verification of the suitability of the SIS is 
carried out.  
 
Besides, we have found out that there exist several certification agencies 
(EXIDA is the most popular one) that measure this parameters in order to 
ensure the validity of calculations carried out in SIL studies.   
 
• Solving the problem: For solving the problem, we had to follow the 
following steps: 
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1. Examining the required level of safety depending on the 
severity of the hazard and the consequences of accidents: As 
explained in 5.4, the required level of safety is determined by 4 
main parameters: degree of consequences (C), exposure 
frequency (F), probability of danger avoidance (P) and 
probability of danger (W). The quantification of this parameters 
led us to conclude the required Safety Integrated Level (SIL) was 
SIL 2. 
 
2. Evaluating devices and replace the failed ones to be able to 
mitigate the consequences that could cause the accident. 
Essentially, we have replaced the instruments by new ones having 
a safety certification for working in dangerous process that could 
require up to a SIL 3 level, and we have redound them following 
the IEC61511 requirements in order to guarantee functional 
safety. 
 
3. Develop a safety integrated system that meets the required 
safety level risk analysis (HAZOP). Once the required SIL level 
has been assigned for the safety instrumented function we are 
analyzing, the main elements are chosen in order to achieve the 
assigned SIL. For this purpose, we have found in the market the 
available devices prior to decide the most suitable ones. 
 
4. Quantitatively and qualitatively verify the validity of the 
safety system intended. By means of the information included in 
the certificates of the elements of the SIF (sensors, logic solver 
and final elements), both quantitatively and qualitatively 
verification can be performed to assure that the design and 
devices selection has been developed correctly. 
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  8.2Importance of IEC61511 and IEC61508 standards 
 
IEC61511 and IEC61508 are crucial in industry as a need for standardization of 
industrial safety.   
Before these standards exist, each engineering company designed their own 
safety systems following their own rules based on their experience, or on the 
requirements stated by the client. This fact was the cause by which a lot of safety 
factors were not taken into account in the design of these safety systems, which led to 
the occurrence of many accidents which could be avoided if there existed some kind of 
standardization of functional safety. 
Nowadays, the creation of these standards and certification agencies such as 
EXIDA© led to improve the design of safety systems, which in turn has led to reduce 
considerably the number of industrial accidents. Most of gas, petroleum and energy 
companies, such as Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Sonatrach (Algeria) or Eon 
(Germany) are requesting SIL 2 to their contractors, for the whole systems of their 
plants, and even SIL 3 for some specific applications. 
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